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IN THE SUPRELE OuURT UF 1HE STATE OF U1AH. 
* * * * 
DON S. SMITH and BRIGHAM H. SMITH, 
plaintiffs, 
vs. 
R, L. WARR, 
Defendant, Cross-plaintiff, 
and Appellant, 
vs. 
J* H.EHLERS, Evelyn P. BOYCE, and 
LOIS P. CONNELL, 
Defendants, cross-defendants, 
and Respondents 2 
Case No. 14,565 
STATEMENT OFJQND i>FJ2 ASE: 
Action on real estate sales contract, wherein title failed, 
and district court judgment was for return of purchase money paid. 
Purchassr filed cross complaint seeking damages, and, on appeal his 
contention that he should have benefit of bargain damages was upheld 
by Supreme Court. Respondents, Boyce and Connell, seek rehearing, 
or modification of judgment. 
RlLIEF_SOUGhT_ON REHEARING C/R^MODIF^CATION 
Respondents, Boyce and Connell, seek a rehearing, or modification 
of judgment, based on matters of law, and exoneration from benefit of 
bargain danages by reason of: special warranty provisions in contract 
of sale of real estate. 
OTAmM_ £F_ FA^TS: 
See respondents1 brieff previously filed herein, at page 2 thereol 
POINT I: BENEFIT OF BARGAIN KULE AS APPLIED HEREIN IS ERRONEOUS 
The opinion of this Honorable Court, holds the cross-defendants 
and respondents, Boyce and uonnell, liable for breach of contract of 
sale of certain real estate and applies the rule of benefit of the 
bargain as the rule of damages to be applied in such situetion. 
The attention of this Honorable Court is directed to the proposi-
tion, long established, that the rule above mentioned is herein inappli 
cable* 
The real estate contracti- signed by the respondents, Boyce and 
Connell, if carried out, would have resulted in a deed to the defendani 
cross-plaintiff and appellant, Warr. The deed would under ordinary 
circumstances /not existing here, however, and as hereinafter set out/ 
would have had covenants of possession, title, andwarran^, and on any 
breach thereof, the measure of damages would have been the return of 
the consideration paid, plus interest thereon. See Section 142 (dj 
Covenants, Corpus Juris Secumdum, page 1010, Volume 21, wherein it is 
stated; 
"As a general rule, the measure ©f damages for a breach 
of the usual covenants of title, results in a total loss 
of the estate conveyed, and is the purchase money paid or 
the value of the consideration with interest thereon. . . 
from thedate of conveyance, or as otherwise stated in some 
cases, the value of the land at the time of the conveyance 
estimated by the purchase price.tf 
It is submitted that this measure of damages for breach of the 
coveants in the deed contracted for is the controlling factor, and 
applicable herein, rather than the benefit of the bargain measure set 
out in the Court's opinion heretofore rendered herein. 
£°IN1 II- T*12 SPECIAL WARRANTY PROVISION OF THE CONTRACT PRECLUDES 
BENEFIT OF THE BARGAIN DAMAGES. 
There is a further cogent reason for limiting the liability of thes 
cross defendants and respondents, to-wit: The limitations contained in 
the special warranty deed contracted for. 
The wording of the warranty to be given, upon payment,is a warranty 
o/ axel*-* " fk c q A # # •+» *s ;t<r~"k ss 
against those claiming "Bv. through m* „****>* +i~~ — 
3. 
case, the respondents, the cross-defendants, Boyce and Connell*) 
The claim of the Smiths was not a claim, by, through, or under, 
or emai&ting from these respondent-defendants, or either of them, but 
something arising totally outside of their contractual commitments. 
To hold this limiting feature of the contractual arrangement is to be 
nullified, enlarged, or ignored, is unfair and inequitable. Ths cross-
plaintiff and Appellant1s recovery under the benefit of the bargain thee 
for which sort of liability the respondent-cross-defendants never agree 
to be or become liable is most unjust* 
It is to be noted that the trial Court found that the defendants, 
cross-defendants and respondents, acted in good faith, and were not 
cognizant of any defects in title or possession, while the cross-plain-
tiff and appellant had opportunity to inspect the premises, check the 
title, generally know the situation before entering into any contract. 
It is submitted that the limiting features of tne coveants contrac 
for, should not be enlarged because the contract was an executory rathe 
than an executed one, and consequently the limiting effects of the agre 
covenants should not be enlarged or ignored, it is submitted that the 
liability of respondents, cross-defendants Boyce and connell should no1 
be based on anybenefit of the bargain rule, as announced in the Courts 
decision and opinion, for the limiting covenant was a very basis of the 
transaction. jftirthermore, the district court only awarded damages base 
on the amount of the consideration paid, and which was to be returned 1 
the appellant, cross-coruplainant ana defendant. The award in the lowei 
court was for an amount which did not exceed the consideration, and no 
cross appeal from that determination was needed or warranted. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The opinion rendered by this Honorable uourt should be reheard, OJ 
modified, or amended in accorcance with the foregoing. 
4. 
Kespectfully submitted, 
T-Richard S. Johnson-; 
207 Atlas building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
T~Robert~"c7 Cuii.mings-) ~" 
320 So. 3rd East Street 
SaLt Lake City, Utah 84111 
SHRVICE: 
Receipt of two copies each, of the foregoing "Brief on and petitioi 
for rehearing, is hereby acknowledged; on this 2nd day of June, 1977. 
Jjoseph C •""Rust j"" ) 
t 
) 
(David A. Westerbyj 
Attorneys for defendant, cross-complainan$, 
and appellant. 
Backman, Clark & Marsh, 
David B. Boyce, 
Milton V. Backi;<an 
By 
Attorneys for defendant, cross-defendant, 
and respondent, J. H. Thiers. 
